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Abstract
Invited a few years ago by one of the field’s leading journals ‘to stimulate discussion about the nature, role
and future of socio-legal studies’ ( JLS Editors 2002: 632), Roger Cotterrell (2002) and Paddy Hillyard
(2002), two leading socio-legal scholars, stress the connection between the legal and the moral. Morality,
they believe, is the heart and soul of the law. For them, only when socio-legal studies allows the lawmorality connection to be its guiding light is it at its strongest. To list five of their examples, this type of
morality-to-the-fore socio-legal studies is open to many influences, is flexible in how it interprets these
influences, produces a rich diversity of intellectual outcomes, expands the boundaries of what counts as
‘law’, and, in doing so, is a leader in the utilisation of the work of Michel Foucault (Cotterrell 2002: 632–9,
Hillyard 2002: 646–50). The field would be lost, they suggest, without the law–morality connection. This
high regard for morality — as the driving force of law, as the very raison d’être of socio-legal studies — is
hardly unusual: it is the common currency of the highly influential brand of socio-legal scholarship that is
consistent with the individual reason-based tradition (exemplified by John Rawls, esp. 1971) or the
communitarian tradition (exemplified by Alisdair MacIntyre, esp. 1988). Yet I contend it is very dangerous,
threatening the role of the law as a vital cog in modern Western countries.

This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol12/iss1/8

Protecting Law from Morality’s
Stalking Horse: The ‘socio’ in
much socio-legal studies
Gary Wickham
Introduction
Invited a few years ago by one of the field’s leading journals ‘to
stimulate discussion about the nature, role and future of socio-legal
studies’ ( JLS Editors 2002: 632), Roger Cotterrell (2002) and Paddy
Hillyard (2002), two leading socio-legal scholars, stress the connection
between the legal and the moral. Morality, they believe, is the heart
and soul of the law. For them, only when socio-legal studies allows the
law-morality connection to be its guiding light is it at its strongest. To
list five of their examples, this type of morality-to-the-fore socio-legal
studies is open to many influences, is flexible in how it interprets these
influences, produces a rich diversity of intellectual outcomes, expands
the boundaries of what counts as ‘law’, and, in doing so, is a leader in
the utilisation of the work of Michel Foucault (Cotterrell 2002: 632–9,
Hillyard 2002: 646–50). The field would be lost, they suggest, without
the law–morality connection. This high regard for morality — as the
driving force of law, as the very raison d’être of socio-legal studies — is
hardly unusual: it is the common currency of the highly influential
brand of socio-legal scholarship that is consistent with the individual
reason-based tradition (exemplified by John Rawls, esp. 1971) or the
communitarian tradition (exemplified by Alisdair MacIntyre, esp.
1988). Yet I contend it is very dangerous, threatening the role of the
law as a vital cog in modern Western countries.
On the back of some critical remarks about Cotterrell’s and
Hillyard’s thinking, this article argues that the ‘society’ component
in this type of ‘law and society’ thinking — the ‘socio’ of this type
of socio-legal studies — is far too readily allowed to serve morality
against the law, sometimes threatening to displace the law altogether.
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(From now on I will use the acronym SLS in referring to the ‘type of
socio-legal studies’ that is my target here — that is, the type that relies
on either the individual reason-based tradition or the communitarian
tradition.) Privileged as the fundamental locus of human interaction,
‘the social’ in this formulation serves as a higher ground, a place from
which to view and condemn the instrumentalism of the law, as well
as of politics and the state. In this manner, for SLS, the social is the
stalking horse of a universal morality of reason and community that
is never clearly specified — one that can be used, and is used often,
to buttress ‘critical’ arguments against instrumentalism — against,
that is, treating the law as an instrument that works independently
of morality, reason and community. Drawing on some research in
intellectual history, the article argues that SLS needs to be clear about
which ‘social’, and associated morality, is being employed in its name
and, at the same time, that it should be wary of the potential of this
‘social’ to minimise the role of law. Law, this is to argue, has to be
protected from morality.
In terms of the governance of society — with society being
understood as a distinct domain of relative liberty and security for
individual subjects (see Wickham 2007) — law is an instrument
operating alongside politics. In arguing this, I shall be highlighting the
paradox that lurks in the oft-repeated exhortation that SLS engage in
social ‘critique’ — the paradox that such ‘critique’ is actually directed
against the very instruments that serve to create and protect the space
in which it operates.
In the first section I offer a critical commentary on what I see as
the weaknesses in Cotterrell’s and Hillyard’s arguments. Then, arguing
for a more clearly focused SLS which will overcome these weaknesses,
I address five overlapping questions in five other sections:
1. How should SLS better understand the contraband morality
of the social?
2. How should it deal with the current dominance of a notion
of morality as the universal morality of reason?
3. How should it better understand the social?
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4. How should it deal it with the current dominance of a
notion of the social based on the idea of rational communio?
5. How should it understand instrumentalism?
I conclude with a summary statement of the course I am proposing
for SLS.

The social on the loose
Neither Cotterrell nor Hillyard make clear what they mean by the social,
or by morality. In singing the praises of the legal pluralist approach
by which SLS may ‘specify a realm of the legal but not necessarily in
categorical fashion’, Cotterrell (2002) says this approach helps situate
‘law’s ultimate authority’ by assessing ‘how far it corresponds with,
or meets, felt needs for regulation of social relations’. Is this to suggest
that law is related to the social in the name of some ultimate, universal
morality of reason? There is not enough evidence in this one snippet
to answer this question, but later, when Cotterrell pointedly rejects the
idea of law as an instrument ‘acting on society’, a ‘Yes’ answer looks
likely. And when he takes this point further, to reject law as a force
‘external to social life’ in favour of ‘law as normative ideas embedded
in social practices’, a ‘Yes’ answer is certain (Cotterrell 2002: 637–8).
For Cotterrell, I suggest, the social functions as both an ontology and
a universal morality of reason. He confirms this when he urges that
more attention be paid to Durkheimian investigations into the ‘moral
foundations of law’. He goes so far as to say that this approach can
be the ‘basis for a powerful moral critique of law’ (Cotterrell 2002:
640–1).
In Cotterrell’s conception, the social rules law and politics, not the
other way around. Law and politics are to be measured against (and
found wanting in terms of ) the social, which is representative of a
universal morality of reason somehow floating above us or within us.
The fact that in the Durkheimian account this morality is said to be a
collective human product makes little difference. The Durkheimian
account gives the collective conscience the same ultimate universality
granted in the accounts of the metaphysicians to the power of reason,
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sometimes via the mysteries of God. The social appears to be this
universal morality’s servant on earth. Law and politics are rendered
social, to be assessed in terms of an ultimate, universal sociality of
reason. In other words, Durkheim ends up providing a sociological
equivalent for Kantian morality. He takes Kant’s idea that morality
be thought of in terms of the collective willing of a community of
rational beings (the ‘kingdom of ends’) and transforms it by finding
‘sociological’ equivalents for the willing in the ritual consciousness
of mythic societies.
On a slightly different matter, I cannot see why we should follow
Cotterrell’s advice and have SLS ‘help to redraw the legal map,
emphasizing how and why the changing character of the social in
transnational and intranational contexts forces changes in structures
of regulation’ (Cotterrell 2002: 642).
‘The law’, for the argument I am presenting here, refers to an
ensemble of juridical institutions operating inside the security envelope
of the state and, while perfectly concrete, this ensemble should not
be thought of as ‘part of ’ some organic social whole. More than this,
it is an instrument that is used to help rule the social. Changes in the
historical disposition of concrete forms of living may well be said to
lead to changes in the nature of law, or be said to be governed by
such changes, but not in a way that suggests a leading role for SLS.
SLS should seek to describe such shifts as carefully as possible, but
should certainly not seek to lead them, as if it has access to a privileged
domain of the social that gives it some kind of moral or intellectual
privilege in legal and political arenas. It hardly needs adding that I do
not think SLS should be searching out ‘sources of moral authority’
for ‘new transnational legal forms’ or, more generally, that it needs
to ‘reassert links between law and morality, viewing morality as the
varied conditions of solidarity necessary to the diverse kinds of relations
of community that comprise the social’ (Cotterrell 2002: 642–3).
The law’s authority is, rather, a contingent historical artefact of its
contingent historical development — this is all it needs and all it can
expect. In all this, as one of my anonymous referees pointed out to me,
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the law is not distinct from its practice, where it deals with ‘social’ and
‘moral’ questions all the time. My point is that the law deals with these
questions by, quite literally, ruling on them. In this sense, I should stress
that my argument is particularly focused on public law, as captured
historically by Martin Loughlin’s detailed study (Loughlin 2003) and
politically by, for example, Jeremy Webber’s defence of public law as
a component of democratic rule (Webber 2006). I will later say a little
more about the importance of public law to my argument.
With this understanding of law, the search for ‘higher’ moral
authority in the name of the social, and in the name of reason, is not
necessary. Indeed, as I said earlier, it is dangerous. Both the social and
the relations of community that comprise it are objects of government
by the state, not realms which somehow provide a moral haven from
such government. With Hillyard, we can see the conversion of the
putative intellectual and moral privilege into the advocacy of moral
indignation. Hillyard is even more explicit than Cotterrell about the
centrality of an ultimate, universal morality of reason that supposedly
underpins the social: ‘the future direction of sociolegal research should
be informed by less theory and more moral indignation’ (2002: 646).
The role of theory may need to be recast, but the field needs more
moral indignation like a hole in the head. Hillyard is a very good social
scientist and very good socio-legal thinker. As such, he should be
aware that moral indignation runs in many directions. It was precisely
to overcome the effects of the excesses involved in clashes of rival
moral indignations that modern public law was developed (Loughlin
2003: 134–52). I think Hillyard is also mistaken in attempting to
tie the empirical study of ‘the material realities of everyday life’ to
a supposedly universal ‘social’ morality of the law; in attempting
to make ‘social inequality’ not only the main focus of SLS but also
the proof of law’s ‘immorality’; and in attempting, as part of this, to
equate the notion of justice to a supposedly universal morality — a
universal justice (Hillyard 2002: 651–6). To talk of ‘everyday life and
its material realities’ should not be code for ‘a necessarily special space’,
as it seems to be for Hillyard. Everyday life and its realities are most
certainly important objects of law’s rule, but they are not important
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because they contain a moral pattern for the way law operates or
should operate. ‘Everyday life’ is just a name for that which we have
not yet begun to think about or deal with. Attempting to alleviate
social inequality is a vital part of the government of modern states. It
might be argued that in some or all of these states this process is not
going as well as it should be, or that it is being stalled by governments
taking the wrong direction. But this is certainly not to say that law is
immoral. To say so strikes me as a far-fetched argument which is far
too reliant on an ultimate, universal social morality of reason against
which law’s performance as a device of government can be judged
(and found wanting). Justice is important, but if it is stripped of its
empirical centre in law and politics as they have historically developed
in modern states it will be weakened to the point of fantasy or, worse,
strengthened to the point of fanaticism.
Three other weaknesses should be highlighted. The first concerns
the role of theory. Here the two authors ostensibly diverge. Where,
as we saw, Hillyard wants less theory in SLS (to make room for more
moral indignation), Cotterrell (2002: 636) wants more — ‘to address
the nature of contemporary law’, to help it ‘to map and organize the
sociolegal realm’. While this looks at first glance like a potentially
interesting argument between our authors, their joint reliance on
an ultimate, universal social morality of reason strips the argument
of its potential. Their ostensible disagreement actually dissolves as
their reliance on a social morality of reason leads them to avoid the
historical work needed to explore that disagreement. Anyone seeking a
balance between theory and empirical work must at least acknowledge
the historical circumstances in which the separation between theory
and fact was formed, and neither Cotterrell nor Hillyard does this.
There is not the room in this piece for me to discuss either the ancient
or modern history of this core dualism in Western thought (for a
stimulating account of the rise and rise of ‘theory’ as a separate sphere
of intellectual endeavour, see Hunter 2006). However, there is room
for me to say why an awareness of the history of the dualism between
theory and empirical work is needed in this debate. To take a position
without it, one way or the other, risks falling into one of the two
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arms of this particular trap of social critique — the trap of making
‘theory’ a space in which sage-like figures (‘theorists’) can somehow
rise above empirical necessity (Cotterrell), or the trap of endorsing an
almost anti-intellectual veneration of ‘the facts’, as if they can speak
for themselves (Hillyard).
Finally we come to the role in SLS of the considerable body of
work by and around Foucault. Our authors are here, too, ostensibly
at loggerheads. While, as noted, Hillyard (2002: 648–51) finds some
aspects of Foucault’s work appealing, he does not like the pervasive
influence Foucault has had on SLS, and not just because it is yet another
example of a theorist pushing too much theory. He is particularly
concerned about the dominance of the Foucaultian account of power.
While he does not want to dispense with this account altogether,
he thinks it is ultimately flawed in that it does not allow SLS ‘to
differentiate between forms and strengths of power’. Cotterrell (2002:
637–9), by comparison, is a big fan of Foucault. He sees much to
admire in the Foucaultian literature, including the work on power:
‘As Foucault revolutionized views of power, sociolegal scholarship
should revolutionize views of law’. Cotterrell is especially taken with
the possibilities for SLS contained in the literature around Foucault’s
neologism ‘governmentality’. He thinks this is a positive way to deal
with ‘the complex inter-relations between, on the one hand, actions
of state agencies at many levels and “private” disciplinary strategies
and normalizing practices that pervade social life’.
I think both authors overestimate Foucault. In light of Ian Hunter’s
(1998) critical comments, Foucault and his followers’ ‘governmentality’
work looks too much like the ‘over-sociological’ theories these
followers are keen to reject. By this I mean that the ‘governmentality’
body of work, like ‘over-sociological’ work more generally, allows the
social to dominate the political and the legal, not allowing the space
for these other categories to operate independently (I have developed
these arguments against Foucault’s treatment of law elsewhere:
Wickham 2006a).
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I turn now to the task of answering the five questions I posed in the
introduction. My answers, I reiterate, amount to an argument about
the need for SLS to rethink its approach to the social (or society) and its
associated morality, and in so doing to revive the autonomy of law and
politics — in sum, to ‘make law central’ in ways Cotterrell’s subtitle
(‘Making Law Central’) promises but does not deliver. In line with
this, my answers add up to a need for SLS to more fully appreciate the
importance of instrumentalism.

A strategy for SLS to deal with the
contraband morality of the social
SLS should thoroughly historicise morality in order to separate it from
the sphere of the social, and when it does so it will discover that society
does not provide the kind of moral-ontological bedrock assumed for
it. Of great interest here is Blandine Kriegel’s The State and the Rule
of Law (1995), an investigation of some early modern statist thinking,
particularly in France and Britain (she is referring especially to Bodin
and Hobbes; I will shortly add to this list two early modern German
thinkers, Pufendorf and Thomasius). She borrows from Nietzsche the
insight that when ‘the Greco-Roman heritage lost its early appeal ...
it was Judeo-Christianity that became the moral tutor of the West’
(Kriegel 1995: 53), but not before she strips it of its romantic antistatism by insisting that Judeo-Christianity be considered only in terms
of its use by the early modern statist theorists.
Kriegel (1995: 33–4) takes us first through the history of a particular
understanding of human rights, or individual rights, as the early
moderns called them. The idea of human rights, she argues, did not
spring suddenly from the loins of the eighteenth-century reformers
and revolutionaries; we should not think of such rights as the product
of the democratic and liberal thinking of this later period. Rather, we
should focus on some early modern French and English theorists, who
developed ‘a doctrine of individual right’ that is not individualistic in
the liberal sense or populist in the democratic sense; it is not social, but
statist. It is concerned with ‘the relationship between, and the limits
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of, the rights of authorities and the rights of individuals’. For Kriegel,
it was the breakthroughs made by these early moderns that made the
eighteenth-century thinking possible.
Kriegel (1995: 34) also argues that the idea of the human being
entailed in the notion of human rights is biblical. The Old Testament
understood humans to be joined to God in a covenant. The New
Testament added the idea that each individual has ‘inalienable value’,
an idea not found, Kriegel emphasises, among the ancient Greeks
or Romans. The early modern jurists, she tells us, took the idea of
‘the supreme dignity of the human being’ and developed it into ‘the
process by which slavery became indefensible’. They ‘obstinately and
patiently established the foundations for personal security and liberty,
those fundamental rights that enabled us to emancipate ourselves from
the state of war and servitude, and which we today take for granted’.
The Jewish component, Kriegel adds, is very much a legal component.
The Jews developed law as a ‘path to securing their future ... The
law, in sum, transcends territory and defeat and the ephemeral lives
of individuals; it assures, so long as it is safeguarded and transmitted,
the perpetuation of an identity’ (Kriegel 1995: 37).
Explicitly linking this to later Christian thinking on the necessity
of faith, Kriegel argues further that faith was the other vital piece of
historical machinery that the early moderns inherited and fashioned
into building blocks for the modern state. This is not to say, of course,
that they took on the notion of faith exactly as they found it, simply
tacking it onto the law. Instead they allowed faith to have a vital role
alongside law precisely by privatising religion: ‘The modern state
... left to the individual and to the church the task of salvation and
concerned itself with justice alone’ (Kriegel 1995: 37). On the back of
this, the ‘juridical sphere ... enjoyed considerable expansion: collective
law had been extended to areas where only fragmentary rights had
been acknowledged; a general system had taken the place of piecemeal
rules with limited application; political right, in sum, had emerged to
overtake civil law’ (Kriegel 1995: 61).
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A strategy for SLS to deal with the current
dominance of a notion of morality as
the universal morality of reason
Here I make considerable use of Hunter’s Rival Enlightenments (2001) to
help make clear the current dominance of universalist (sociological and
metaphysical) conceptions of reason. Citing Kriegel, Hunter (2001: 12)
criticises the continuing, combined effects of metaphysical philosophy
and dialectical historiography. He concentrates on seventeenth-century
Germany after the Treaty of Westphalia, especially on the efforts
of Pufendorf and Thomasius to build a civil philosophy. This civil
philosophy, he argues, was developed as a rival to the then-dominant
metaphysical philosophy. This is no stroll through the past, despite its
erudition. While much of the furniture of modern law and politics
appears to be firmly of this world, Hunter argues that the gains of
the early modern statist thinkers have been whittled away by an
ongoing metaphysical ‘fightback’ beginning with Liebniz and Wolff,
immediately in the wake of the civil philosophers’ work, but pushed
along most forcefully by Kant and his followers from the middle of the
eighteenth century onwards. Hunter argues that this fightback is still
having its pernicious effects, both through dialectical historiography
and through those forms of social theory that perpetuate metaphysical
conceptions of reason. For example, in posing a criticism that is
not difficult to apply to SLS, Hunter (2001: ix–x) says that ‘the allassimilating, all-unifying mill of dialectical philosophical history ...
gives shape not just to history, but also to the [analyst of history] …
Under these intellectual conditions, the [analyst] views the past in
terms of the unreconciled oppositions — between rationalism and
voluntarism, intellectualism and empiricism — and finds his or her
own ethical impulse in the need to repeat the moment of their Kantian
reconciliation’.
In adopting this approach, Hunter is concerned to combat modern
moral philosophy. Much of this branch of modern philosophy, he
argues, was initiated as a direct challenge to the early modern civil
philosophers. It was directed particularly at what Hunter sees as the
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greatest achievement of these early moderns: substituting a worldly
pragmatic political end — the preservation of social peace — for the
suffocating morality of human reason (2001: 12). By Hunter’s way
of thinking, the state ‘was not born to combat human sinfulness’,
and the goal of politics is not to attain ‘general moral and economic
well-being’ or true community, but rather to attain ‘political order’,
leading to social peace. Hunter (2001: 252–3) is adamant that it is
this instrumentalist achievement that modern moral philosophy seeks
to overturn, by demanding for itself the sole carriage of all matters
of ‘reason’, insisting that ‘reason’ cannot be separated from morality
and that morality cannot be separated from sociality. For Hunter,
in other words, modern moral philosophy and social theory are the
continuation of traditional metaphysical philosophy by other means.
As noted above, most of his fire is directed at Kant and the Kantians.
This is a long and fascinating argument, and one which we cannot
follow too far; I borrow from it only what is necessary for my purposes
— the formulation of a means to productively restrict the scope of
the social as it is relevant to SLS, especially to restrict its reliance on
the idea of a universal morality of reason (the following argument,
unless otherwise specified, is drawn from Hunter 2001: 20, 271–304,
312–29, 340, Hunter: 2003).
Hunter wants us to understand the impact of those of Kant’s
arguments that take human reason as the model for God, as opposed
to taking God as the model for human reason. For Hunter this is
something of a conjuring trick as Kant actually takes his conception of
human reason from the traditional metaphysical conception of God —
God the divine intellect, creator of the intelligible forms (or noumena)
that it itself intuits. But more than a simple conjuring trick, it is the basis
of a move whereby modern scholars, including modern SLS scholars,
attempt to elevate their own normative adoption of Kantian moral
philosophy. By this argument Hunter means to challenge all those who
elevate the norms they have inherited from Kant, whether wittingly or
unwittingly, over any empirical description of the actual step they are
taking in making the Kantian move. Hunter thus targets those who are
keen to steer well clear of the idea that in taking this step they are the
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children of a particular form of north German religious rationalism,
one with its own political project — to overturn the achievements of
the civil philosophers. In other words, the problem Hunter is dealing
with is not that a Kantian morality is a competitor to a morality
gathered together by the early moderns; this is not sour grapes over a
big loss in some war of moralities. Rather the problem is that Kantian
moral philosophy seeks to overturn the early moderns’ strict separation
of law and politics on the one hand from morality on the other (see
also Wickham 2006b). To adopt David Saunders’s (Saunders 2002:
2179) delightful turn of phrase, in a piece that seeks to reinvigorate the
idea of the law’s autonomy, where Pufendorf and other early moderns
had worked tirelessly to combat the idea that law and politics are part
of ‘a stairway to salvation’, Kant rebuilt the stairway but moved it to
a different part of the house (see also Saunders 1997).
The Kantian position effectively serves as a defence of the universal
morality of human reason precisely by denying the need for such a
defence. It promotes itself as simply the expression of human reason,
a force so fundamental it needs no defence. Certainly it rejects any
defence that uses the realm of the empirical, for it holds that it alone
commands the empirical, in the name of human reason. By this
‘defence by not being a defence’ (which, it is has to be said, has worked
for over two hundred years), the realm of the noumenal — divine
intellection and a universe of pure rational beings — is supposedly
beyond human understanding. Yet it can also, it seems, serve as the
standpoint from which moral judgments are undertaken, including
the judgments of many of those working in SLS.
The notion of homo duplex is being asked to do a lot of work here.
Basically, this is the Platonic anthropological premise that human
beings have two natures — one a sensuous nature, which has us deal
with the brute realities of life as it is experienced in time and space, the
other a rational or intelligible nature, which not only has us deal with
the world through the application of reason but also supposedly allows
us to participate in divine reason and will. Hunter says that this Platonic
anthropology was, crucially, the anthropology of German university
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metaphysics in Kant’s time. Kant did more than learn it, however. It
became the anthropological underpinning of his moral philosophy. In
particular, just as it allowed German metaphysics to perform the task of
ethical self-formation, producing in its adherents a vision of themselves
as pure rational beings with the capacity to overcome the weaknesses
that flow from the ‘other’ side of human nature — the sensuous or
empirical side — so it performed this task in Kant’s philosophy. In
this way, the notion of transcendence through reason (transcendence
of the ‘lower’ self, but ultimately of all matters empirical) is not only
passed on to others, as a sort of ethical grooming; it is also actively
fostered in the self through a type of permanent dissatisfaction, a will
to critique (for more on the idea of ethical grooming see also Brown
1988, Hadot 1995). We need not go into any more detail, but I note
in passing that this is what seems to me to be going on with many of
the moves Cotterrell and Hillyard make, and urge others to make.

A strategy for SLS to deal with the social?
SLS might begin to reform its approach to the role of society, or the
social, by heeding Kriegel’s (1995: 5 n27) concern about what the
romantic version of the social did to perceptions of the state: ‘The
state came to be viewed as an inert but complex mechanism dedicated
to social reproduction; its motions are all reactive, parasitic on the
active forces of society ... sucking the life from the social organism’.
From the beginning of the nineteenth century, she continues, ‘[t]he
word “social” would from now on cover everything’, such that ‘the
romantic theorem of an immanent society’ became the overwhelming
intellectual force in social thinking (1995: 116–7). She laments the fact
that, under the pervasive influence of romanticism, so many modern
scholars seem unable to see that ‘collectivity has been reduced to society
and politics seen as nothing if it is not social ... We have forgotten
that the social is not the whole’ (1995: 118). In SLS this unfortunate
tendency seems overwhelming.
Hunter (2001; 66 n34) thinks the most damaging effect of this
problematic version of the social is its role in promoting a form of
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history that ‘treat[s] civil philosophy as a defective expression of
society and reason’, the form that ignores the vital ‘relation between
the juridical and political dimensions of civil philosophy’. He condemns
social thinking for treating the ‘political-jurisprudential character
of civil philosophy’ as part of some ‘cultural-historical “failure”’, a
failure to ground ‘law and politics in a democratically self-governed
... “public sphere”’. Hunter (2001: 66–7) argues further that this false
social vision of seventeenth-century civil philosophy blinds us to
this style of philosophy’s ‘(statist) political-jurisprudential character’
and imposes ‘a historical dynamic which is intrinsically oriented to a
self-governing society or a self-governing reason’. For Hunter, as for
Kriegel of course, ‘early modern politics and jurisprudence cannot
be explained either in terms of a theory of ... society or in terms of
a philosophy of subjectivity’. Law and politics cannot be viewed as
simply epiphenomena of a social-moral ontology; they must be treated
as irreducible institutional domains whose independence is itself an
historical achievement arising from the desacralisation of politics in the
early modern period. This is to say that SLS should not only historicise
the social, it should historicise it by recovering the autonomy of law
and politics.
While Hunter does not in any way dispute Kriegel’s arguments
against the insidious effects of German romanticism, he heads in a
different direction by investigating an underlying assumption of the
romantic movement — the assumption of the Platonic anthropology of
homo duplex, which we met earlier. His main focus is on the supposed
superiority of reason — on the idea that reason can overcome the
effects of our voluntaristic nature. For Hunter, Platonism has been
able to continue to exert its sway largely, though not wholly, because
of the way it was taken up and adapted in Christian metaphysics. He
introduces the theme that a ‘Christian–Platonic pursuit of pure rational
being ... drove metaphysical philosophy for Liebniz through Wolff to
Kant and beyond’ (2001: x). Of especial interest to him, of course, is the
way in which this package was used by the early modern metaphysical
philosophers as part of their campaign to ward off the challenge from
early modern civil philosophy. The ‘metaphysical anthropology of homo
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duplex’ allowed ‘them to explicate the Christian mysteries and reveal
the pure concepts of morality and justice underlying the civil order’.
On this basis, ‘they claimed authority to limit the governance of the
earthly city in accordance with the laws of its divine archetype, thereby
advancing the interests of the academic-clerical estate’ (2001: 28). As
such, he suggests, the metaphysicians encouraged an understanding
of sociality based on ‘pure concepts of morality and reason’. By this
way of thinking, people come together, as ‘society’, under the cover of
pure reason-based morality, such that ‘disorder’ and ‘disharmony’ are
sheeted home to a failure to overcome the effects of our voluntaristic
nature — that is, to the failure to fully realise or exercise our capacity
to reason. (I have elsewhere developed, as I hinted earlier, an extensive
argument in favour of historically restricting the notion of the social,
or society, as it is most commonly employed in the ‘socio’ disciplines,
especially sociology: Wickham 2007.)

A strategy for SLS to deal with the currently
dominant understanding of the social
based on the idea of rational community
In seeking to recover the autonomy of law and politics, SLS should also
seek to recover the most viable alternative to the Christian-Platonic
version of sociality available to it. This is the one that was developed
by the early modern thinkers as laid out above. Thomasius puts the
thinking behind its development extremely clearly:
[N]othing has been more responsible for derailing man’s natural pursuit of
a long and happy earthly life than the mixing and confusion of these two
kinds of truth; from this have arisen shameful exercises of priestcraft with
all their attendant misery of religious tyranny and conflict ... [Thomasius
targets especially] those who inherited the pagan philosophical conception
of nature and mixed it with the Christian doctrine of creation — that is,
the metaphysicians. Ensnared by ‘Platonic fables,’ the metaphysicians not
only produced a bastard philosophical-theological conception of a creation
divided into visible and invisible things, they also used their alleged insight
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into transcendent being as the basis for doctrine-mongering and religious
oppression (Thomasius, quoted in Hunter 2001: 85).

Hunter argues that in attacking metaphysical philosophy’s reliance
on the Christian–Platonic package in this way, Thomasius was engaged
in nothing less than the ground-clearing stage of an attempt to build
a different intellectual ethos, one ‘suited to the jurists and politici of
the desacralised state’ (Hunter 2001: 10 n34). This would certainly be
a better focus for SLS than fostering social critique. In building this
alternative account of the social, the early modern civil philosophers
‘enabled its bearers to separate their own deepest religious and moral
convictions from the formulation of laws aimed solely at civil security’.
In this way, through the effective ‘privatisation’ of religion — in this
case insisting that people’s religious beliefs not interfere with their now
separate ‘desacralised’ public duties — civil philosophy helped ground
‘the new doctrines of territorial sovereignty and desacralised politics
in a specific intellectual deportment’ (Hunter 2001: 28).
This ‘detranscendentalising’ of politics and law further marks the
alternative version of sociality — whereby the social must be ruled
rather than fostered, governed rather than celebrated — as a vital
resource for SLS, if it is to be effective in this world. At the heart of the
alternative is an Epicurean ‘anti-metaphysical voluntarism’ by which
‘Pufendorf and Thomasius denied ... the transcendent truths of man’s
moral nature or moral community’ in favour of an understanding
of ‘his limitless capacity for mutual self-destruction’ (Hunter 2001:
89; see also Epicurus 1993, 1994, Joy 1987, Osler 1991). Pufendorf,
Hunter says, in acknowledging him as the principal thinker behind
the alternative,
characterises natural man as a creature whose weakness ... necessitates
sociality for survival but whose ‘vices render dealing with him risky and
make great caution necessary to avoid receiving evil from him instead
of good.’ Unlike the beasts, man’s appetites for sex and food are limitless
and impossible to satisfy. Moreover: ‘Many other passions and desires are
found in the human race unknown to the beasts, as, greed for unnecessary
possessions, avarice, desire of glory and surpassing others, envy, rivalry
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and intellectual strife. It is indicative that many of the wars by which the
human race is broken and bruised are waged for reasons unknown to the
beasts’ ... Man’s petulance, his capacity for giving and receiving offence,
combined with his extraordinary capacity for violence, makes his natural
condition a very dangerous one, particularly when one takes into account
the great divisions in human beliefs and ways of life. In short: ‘Man, then,
is an animal with an intense concern for his own preservation, needy by
himself, incapable of protection without the help of his fellows, and very
well fitted for the mutual provision of benefits. Equally, however, he is at
the same time malicious, aggressive, easily provoked and as willing as he
is able to inflict harm on others’ ... Man’s life in the state of nature would
thus indeed be miserable, unadorned, and short. It would not, however,
be ungoverned by natural law or bereft of friendship as a primitive form
of sociality. This is because man is indeed equipped by nature to know
the natural law, even if he is not equipped to govern himself in accordance
with it (Hunter 2001: 171–2; see also Hunter 2003, 2004, Hunter and
Saunders 2003a, 2003b).

SLS would do well to see that Pufendorf is thereby offering to
it a complex account of the social as simultaneously the outcome of
human desire for companionship, the site of the worst excesses of
human passions, and the site of the governance of those passions, by a
combination of law and politics. By this account, humans are drawn
into a realm of sociality and have, at one and the same time, and at all
times, the urge to destroy the benefits of this sociality and the capacity
to effectively govern this urge.

A strategy for SLS to deal with instrumentalism
I have already indicated the way in which SLS might better understand
instrumentalism — by treating law and politics as autonomous
instruments used in building the type of state that fosters and protects
individual liberty — but to fully outline a strategy for SLS to deal with
instrumentalism I need to emphasise seven further points.
The first is Hunter’s attempt to counter the bad press instrumentalism
has received since the end of the seventeenth century. He says that we
should, ‘through a protracted exercise in intellectual reconstruction’,

120

Protecting Law

not think of the early modern instrumentalism as an unfortunate lapse,
but rather as a ‘difficult achievement’ (Hunter 2001: 68).
Second is Kriegel’s summary of the careful distinction the early
moderns drew between law and right, such that a right cannot possibly
be an instrument without the operation of law; it is law that is the
crucial instrument (Kriegel 1995: 62 n27).
A third and closely related point is that ‘desacralisation assumed
a specific and limited form — that of ‘juridification’ — as a result of
the fact that Protestant political jurists were forced to deal with the
staggering problems of confessional politics and religious civil war in
the only way they could, by juridifying them’. This use of law as an
instrument, Hunter (2001: 82 n34) tells us, was not born of ‘secularrational philosophy’, or ‘Roman law as such’, but of the ‘unique set
of intellectual and historical circumstances’ whereby, ‘once it became
abundantly clear that the religious wars were incapable of theological
adjudication or military-political termination, Protestant jurists
developed a series of measures designed to end the conflicts by securing
the coexistence of the confessions within the legal framework of the
Empire’. These developments, we should be clear, ‘were not the result
of transcendent philosophical reflection whose culmination would
come in the democratic natural law theories of the Aufklärung’. Rather,
‘they arose as unplanned consequences of a whole series of juridical
improvisations undertaken by anonymous political jurists seeking the
political-legal bases of social peace’ (Hunter 2001: 84). In other words,
the type of law I am discussing in this article is made up of a set of
mechanisms of rule, forged in extremely difficult circumstances, to
operate alongside political mechanisms — albeit often in great tension
with them, a point to be taken up in more detail shortly — to help
restrain human violence and deliver greater security and liberty to a
greater number of subjects. In this way, in criticising SLS, I am not
criticising law per se.
Our fourth point is Kriegel’s extensive treatment of sovereignty
(1995: 15–32), a vital part of her defence of the state. She rescues an
instrumentalist understanding of sovereignty in criticising the anti-
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statist tendency to confuse it with absolutism. She pays special attention
to the early moderns’ argument that ‘public offices belong neither to
lords nor to a prince, nor to a state, for they are the state itself ’ (1995:
26–7). Warming to her theme, Kriegel (1995: 27) compares what the
early moderns achieved, with their understanding of sovereignty as a
mix of law and politics, to what the later, nineteenth-century ‘social’
philosophers achieved by linking ‘politics formally to economics’:
This rejection of the doctrine of the independence ... of politics ... is the
point of departure for later ‘social’ theory. The notion of the ‘power of
property,’ of the spirit of the laws as the spirit of property, has in the wake
of Marx been applied to all forms of society. The jurists had applied it
only to feudalism. It is no exaggeration to say that social theory exercises
a return to the seignorial doctrine; having shed its commitment to the
independence of the legal and political realm, it winds up holding that
the social is all there is (Kriegel 1995: 27).

Fifth on our list is the idea of law and politics operating together,
an idea taken up by Kriegel and Hunter in quite different ways. For
Kriegel (1995: 58–9), the early moderns, in seeking ‘to juridify the
political sphere’, transformed ‘the essence of politics’, eschewing a
return to classical models in favour of ‘entirely original objectives’: ‘to
discern ... the proper ... amount and distribution of power itself ’. To be
more precise, the early moderns, as ‘doctrinarians of sovereignty and
defenders of the rule of law, kept the link between power and law that
was forged by feudalism, but they inverted the relationship between
the two. Instead of trying to balance laws with powers, they subjected
power to law and in so doing civilized the law’. By Hunter’s arguments
(and mine), the relationship between law and politics is tenser than this.
For him, inasmuch as ‘the relation between political and jurisprudential
conceptions of the desacralisation of civil governance ... holds the key
to understanding what is meant by “civil” in civil philosophy’ (2001:
74 n34), attempts to juridify politics should be understood as always
being matched by, or countered by, attempts to politicise law, and vice
versa. In furthering this line of argument, Hunter (2001: 83–4) talks
of the development of German public or political law, Staatsrecht, as a
‘specifically juridical autonomising of political governance’. In this way,
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he sees the coming together of law and politics as the union of two
‘independent strategies ... each drawing on the intellectual resources
at its disposal in order to forge instruments capable of meeting the
challenge to governance posed by religious civil war’.
Our sixth point is Hunter’s debt to the work of Carl Schmitt. He
sees Schmitt as an ally in ‘the “intellectual civil war” between civil
and metaphysical philosophy’, inasmuch as Schmitt ‘deliberately targets
post-Kantian “political Romanticism” for its treatment of historical
politics as the manifestation of transcendental-subjective categories,
thereby reducing the contestation between political enemies to an
a-political debate over the good life’ (Hunter 2001: 11, see also Schmitt
1976, 1986). Of course, Hunter is not taking on board Schmitt’s
unfortunate tendency to push his arguments towards their totalitarian
extreme. For Hunter, as for Kriegel and for me, arguments such as
those being put here are much more useful for promoting a style of
political centrism — one that respects the need for authority and sees
in its careful exercise the greatest likelihood of delivering widespread
security and liberty for individual subjects — than for promoting
totalitarianism.
Finally, we have Hunter’s (2001: 77–9) argument that the
‘desacralisation of politics’ was ‘not the reflex expression of an epochal
philosophical breakthrough or general rationalisation of society’. He
draws especially on the work of Horst Dreitzel, who seeks to resuscitate
the thinking of the seventeenth-century political theorist Henning
Arnisaeus: ‘Arnisaeus conceives of political order as the historical
form of rule or domination characteristic of a particular kind of
society ... not as a constitutional order imposing normative limits on
the prince’s conduct, but as an empirical reality whose maintenance
constitutes the “scientific” end of the prince’s political action’. Hunter
concludes that this secularisation of politics was the result of a pointedly
instrumentalist move:
In reconstructing politics in terms of the instrumental maintenance
of any historically existing form of rule, Arnisaeus sought to render it
autonomous of scholastic moral philosophy in general. In particular he
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sought to free politics from its Aristotelian conception as the form of
rule required to realise man’s moral nature or his moral communio ... to
make the concept of the state independent of all moral-philosophical and
religious foundations ... to autonomise politics by expelling the church
from the state, seizing that eternal ecclesiological stalking-horse — the
moral community — and transforming it from the source of sovereign
power into the latter’s main target (Hunter 2001: 78).

Taken together, these seven points help further our understanding
of what SLS might achieve by ditching its reliance on the idea of a
universal social backed by a universal morality of reason.

Conclusion
Having carefully specified the target of my remarks — the type of
socio-legal studies that relies on either the individual reason-based
tradition or the communitarian tradition, both of which place morality
at the centre of their concerns, which I have referred to throughout as
SLS — I have developed an argument towards the proposition that SLS
needs to completely reinvigorate the prefix ‘socio’. My argument has it
that the best way to do this is to retrieve from early modern Europe the
hard-won autonomy of law and politics. This autonomising was crucial
for the development of the politico-legal governing arrangements that
protect life and limb in modern Western countries, thereby creating
and protecting the space in which SLS itself operates. No longer should
SLS fear instrumentalism. Rather, it should study it carefully, for it was
precisely in developing law and politics as instruments, in the manner
described above, that some early modern thinkers, always under the
threat that religious civil violence would become worse than it already
was, were able to work towards the aforementioned set of governing
arrangements. Equally, SLS should not condemn these governing
arrangements for their this-worldly mix of politics and law — should
not treat them as a major impediment to the process whereby human
society can attain a higher moral existence and overcome the violent
effects of its baser past. Rather, these arrangements too should be
carefully studied. Working in tandem with lower-level restraints like
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the spread of literacy, or the inculcation of good manners (see Davidson
1999, Elias 1994, Hunter 1988), the equilibrium of politics and law in
question helps limit the violence of human collectivities as they operate
in this world. While it would be churlish not to acknowledge that this
equilibrium is far from perfect — as an achievement of this world it
does not seek perfection, but it can certainly be improved — it is the
best means yet developed for achieving social peace. If SLS were to
study this capacity of this equilibrium in this way, it could not only
value the benefits of this manner of ruling the social; it could also value
the fact that the social needs to be ruled, not celebrated as a means to
a higher moral existence. If SLS were to do these things, it would go
a long way towards protecting law from morality’s stalking horse.
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